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§ 1 . Introduction 
Since the human cost of war is inevitably great, the West has 
traditionally articulated, defended, and at least nominally practiced 
a theory of fighting just wars. Unfortunately, this laudable theory 
is liable to attack because of the widely recognized doctrine of the 
'supreme emergency exemption' (SEE). This doctrine states that a 
nation at war may directly target the civilian population of an enemy 
nation in an emergency situation, even though such use of force is 
forbidden by the other rules of just war theory. As a result, just war 
theory (JWT) appears to offer paradoxical advice, for it says both 
that civilians may never be targeted, and also that civilians may be 
targeted in certain circumstances. 
Traditional just war proponents such as Michael Walzer 1 and 
Brian Orend 2 both appreciate this problem but insist that it is nec-
essary to retain this paradox,3 since the SEE seems to explain many 
difficult wartime situations. I regard their views as both problem-
atic and unnecessary. They are problematic because they threaten 
to undermine the credibility of J W T itself. The main rival to J W T is 
1 Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations. Basic Books; New York, 2000 Ed. 
2 Orend, Brian. Michael Walzer: On War and Justice. McGill-Queen's Univer-
sity Press; Montreal, 2000 ed. 
3 Orend reclassifies the paradox as a dilemma, but agrees with Walzer that 
it must remain a central feature of just war theory. 
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the flat rejection of the very notion of rules in warfare, henceforth 
referred to as the 'war is hell' theory.4 Walzer and Orend, although 
it is quite against their intentions, are actually giving credibility to 
the 'war is hell' theory. This is because its main appeal is the belief 
that in war, nations are willing to do anything in order to survive. 
Hence, any attempt to place moral constraints on warfare is hope-
less: a war is a struggle for survival, and a struggle for survival knows 
no rules. Thus, when Walzer and Orend insist that there are times 
in war when the rules of J W T may be suspended, they are affirming 
what the 'war is hell' theorist affirms. 
Fortuitously, the SEE need not result in paradox. If I can show 
that the SEE can be incorporated into the traditional rules of war-
fare in a way that does not create a paradox, I will show that J W T 
is a coherent theory; and since it is a coherent theory, it is more 
likely to be accepted. I want to make J W T as appealing as possible, 
because I agree with Walzer and Orend that it gives expression to 
many admirable moral intuitions. After briefly describing the main 
tenets of J W T (§2), I will describe the SEE through an analysis of two 
historical examples (§3). I will then give an account of Walzer's and 
Orend's respective attempts to address this paradox, (§4, §5) and 
why those responses are insufficient (§6). This will lead to my own 
solution - an expansion of the principle of minimal force (§7). 
§ 2 . J u s In Bello Principles 
Just war theory has two main components, jus ad bellum (justice 
in going to war) and jus in bello (justice in fighting the war). This 
distinction is made necessary because "it is perfectly possible for a 
just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in 
strict accordance with the rules" (JUW 21). A discussion of the prin-
ciples that decide justice in going to war is not relevant here since 
the supreme emergency exemption can only be enacted by nations 
that have already satisfied the rules of jus ad bellum. The supreme 
emergency exemption, then, is a jus in bello matter. Brian Orend 
4 See Walzer, pp. 29-33. 
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extracts two relevant jus in hello principles5 from Walzer's writings 
that are commonly advanced in some form by most theorists, and 
it is through the relationship of these principles that the supreme 
emergency exemption emerges. First is the principle of discrimination, 
which is so-called because it seeks to discriminate between sources 
of direct harm and sources of indirect harm (or non-harm) within 
an enemy nation. This principle captures the moral intuition that it 
is morally wrong to target civilians, and so dictates that attacks must 
be confined to military personal and bases only:6 "All non-harming 
persons or institutions are thus immune from direct and intentional 
attack by soldiers" (MW 112). There is of course the difficultly of 
articulating the moral ground that explains why soldiers, particularly 
conscripted ones, are deprived of their rights in such a way as to al-
low them to be targeted. However, it is typically unproblematic in 
the just war tradition to think that it is wrong to target civilians who 
are not directly related to the war effort. 
Second is the principle of proportionality. This principle is a version 
of a jus ad hello principle, which "requires that the anticipated moral 
cost of fighting the war be in line with the moral benefits" (129). 7 
This is a decision that must be made in advance of going to war. In 
the context of jus in hello, the principle is not very different: "the 
term proportionality [sic] refers to the total calculus of the balance 
of good and evil associated with a particular operation or actions in 
the course of war" (MCW129). In practice, this means that a nation's 
strategy must consider whether what will be gained is proportional 
to what will be lost. For instance, it may be disproportionate to de-
molish a small Nazi weapons hold if doing so would compromise the 
safety of many German citizens. This prohibition holds despite the 
fact that it would be good in an absolute sense to demolish a Nazi 
weapons hold. 
5 There are more than two, but since the supreme emergency exemption 
arises in the conflict between the two principles articulated below, I will con-
fine my discussion to them. 
6 Civilians may become a direct threat through by manufacturing weapons. 
In this case, they lose their 'non-harm' status. 
7 Moral Constraints on War: Principle and Causes. Edited by Bruno Coppieters 
and Nick Fotion. Lexington Books, London; 2002 ed. 
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The principle of discrimination and the principle of proportion-
ality can typically be upheld at the same time - but not in every case. 
The idea of the supreme emergency exemption is that it allows the 
principle of discrimination to be suspended in favor of the principle 
of proportionality in the case of an emergency. It is legitimate to 
claim that there is an emergency when two criteria are met simulta-
neously. First, the attacked country must face an imminent danger; 
second, the character of the danger must have the potential to be 
unusually devastating.8 When these two criteria are in play at once, 
according to just war theory, a nation may target civilians directly if 
that is the best way to achieve victory in the war. I now turn to an 
apparent example and then an actual example of the legitimate use 
of the supreme emergency exemption. 
§ 3 The Supreme Emergency Exemption 
An interesting way to illustrate the SEE is by giving an example 
of a misapplication of it. This may be seen in Truman's decision to 
drop atomic bombs on the Japanese civilian populations in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.9 Military intelligence predicted that if the war 
were to continue under normal conditions (i.e. more invasions of 
Japanese military bases), a million additional American soldiers and 
even more Japanese soldiers would be lost before the war would end. 
Regardless of the accuracy of these predictions, it is easy to imagine 
how the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have 
seemed reasonable given that those bombings would end the lives 
of perhaps 200,000 civilians. Although targeting civilians is typically 
off-limits, the vastly skewed casualty estimates raised a moral dilem-
ma. A 200,000 civilian loss is by all standards horrific, but when the 
lives of 2 million or more service members are in the balance, those 
potential civilian losses appear mercifully small. This was a situation 
when the principle of discrimination and the principle of propor-
8 See Walzer, pp. 251-255. 
9 To call Truman's decision a misapplication of the supreme emergency 
exemption is of course argumentative, since many reasonable people (still) 
find his decision to be the right one. However, according to orthodox just war 
theory, especially Walzer, there is no doubt. Truman's actions conflict with just 
war theory. See pp. 263-68 of Just and Unjust Wars. 
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tionality were in clear conflict, and it became necessary to choose 
one. One could decide to honor the principle of discrimination, and 
in that case, the civilian bombings would be strictly forbidden. Tru-
man, of course, chose to uphold the principle of proportionality. 
At the time, the Japanese threat must have seemed like a supreme 
emergency. Indeed, Walzer says that in the midst of battle it seems 
as though "every war is an emergency" (JUW 2S\). However, he does 
not believe that there was a genuine emergency in this case. Walzer 
has said that two things must be present simultaneously in order to 
justify use of this exemption: both the "imminence of the danger" 
and the severity of the danger, for it "must be of an unusual and 
horrifying kind" (JUW 253). Both criteria must be present, for "[n] 
either one by itself is sufficient as a . . . defense of the extraordinary 
measures extremity is thought to require" (JUW 252). He symbol-
izes Truman's dilemma: "if we don't x, we will do/" (267). That is to 
say that when Truman decided to bomb the civilian populations, he 
had other options, such as the afore-mentioned direct military inva-
sions.1 0 For Walzer, this is therefore not a true supreme emergency; 
that term is reserved for times when the formula is this: "if we don't 
x . . . , they will do/" (267). This formula underscores the fact that 
the nation considering action must have no options at all, unless an-
nihilation counts as an option. The lack of options is what makes a 
difficult wartime decision an emergency, which is not what America 
faced with regard to Japan in World War II. 
To demonstrate what Walzer regards as a legitimate use of 
the SEE, he turns to another specific historical example, namely, 
Churchill's decision to bomb civilians on the verge of the Nazi take-
over of England. For Walzer, the Nazi threat met both criteria for 
enacting the SEE, namely, the proximity and serious nature of the 
danger. In 1940, the Nazi threat was of such a character that Walzer 
seconds Churchill's statement that "a German victory in World War 
II 'would be fatal, not only to ourselves, but to the independent life 
of every small country in Europe"' (JUW 254). This state-of-affairs, 
coupled with the fact that all of England's significant war allies at the 
time were conquered and that Hitler had already commenced bomb-
1 0 There has even been speculation that Japan might have accepted a con-
ditional surrender at that point in the war. 
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ings on London, provided a historical example of a country thrust 
"under the rule of necessity . . . " (JUW 254). 
Thus, Walzer believes that Churchill justifiably ordered the Roy-
al Air Force to begin targeting and bombing the civilians of the city 
of Dresden. Over the next years, over one million people who were 
not a direct threat to England were killed or seriously injured by 
England's decision (JUW 255). The seriousness of the cost of civil-
ian lives is not lost on Walzer, and he does not take such a decision 
lightly. He never wavers in his belief that even the Tightness of such 
an action can never satisfy our sorrow about the human tragedy. In-
deed, he condemned England's continued practice of civilian bomb-
ing after the supreme emergency was over and England again found 
itself in 'normal' wartime horror. It should be pointed out that Wal-
zer is fully aware of what he has said: civilians must not be targeted, 
but Churchill did the right thing by targeting civilians. I now turn to 
Walzer's attempted reconciliation of these apparently contradictory 
statements. 
§ 4 . Walzer 's "Dirty H a n d s " Policy 
Walzer maintains that it is necessary to retain this paradox. He 
even offers a priori criticism of any future attempts at a resolution: 
"A [rival] moral theory . . . might achieve greater coherence, but it 
would miss or it would repress the reality of war" (JUW 326) . The 
SEE creates a paradox by conflicting with the principle of discrim-
ination: "in supreme emergencies our judgments are doubled, re-
flecting the dualist character of the theory of war and the deeper 
complexity of our moral realism; we say yes and no, right and wrong" 
(JUW 326). But what is the problem with a paradox? Is war not al-
ready a paradox, in which "the world can present us with situations 
in which there is no honorable or moral course for a man to take . . . " 
(JUW326)? For Walzer, the answer is an emphatic 'yes.' He says that 
"the world of war is not a fully comprehensible, let alone a morally 
satisfactory place. And yet it cannot be escaped, short of a universal 
order in which the existence of nations and peoples could never be 
threatened" (JUWZ21). 
This is Walzer's way of saying that the paradox created by the 
supreme emergency exemption is not particularly shocking, for it is 
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merely one more upsetting paradox in an already long line of moral 
paradoxes of conflict, and we should therefore not be surprised or 
scandalized that such an exemption exists. However, Walzer still 
does diagnose a problem here; the problem as he sees it is that the 
paradox threatens us by threatening not to offer any coherent moral 
advice. Therefore, the paradox is not itself a problem, but a theory 
that says 'yes' and 'no' at the same time seems to offer no real-world 
advice. This is indeed a problem for Walzer, because the raison d'etre 
of just war theory is to offer practical advice that guides warfare in 
such a way that limits violations of human rights as much as possible. 
If such a theory said 'yes' and 'no' at the same time, it might be con-
demned on the grounds that it would paralyze the nation that must 
act. 
Walzer recognizes this problem and attempts to remedy it by 
showing how it is possible after all to derive practical moral advice 
from such a state of affairs via his 'dirty-hands policy.' The dirty hands 
in question are the dirty hands of those who ordered and carried out 
the bombings: "What are we to say about those military commanders 
(or political leaders) who override the rules of war and kill innocent 
people in a 'supreme emergency?" (JUW 323). These commanders 
and leaders have lived out the paradox by doing "what was necessary 
and right [and] also wrong" (JUW 324, my italics). Decision-makers 
in a supreme emergency "must opt for collective survival and over-
ride those rights that have suddenly loomed as obstacles to survival" 
(JUW 326). The catch is that "they are [not] free of guilt when they 
do that , . . . And they can only prove their honor by accepting respon-
sibility for those decisions and by living out the agony" (JUW 326). 
That is, their hands are dirty, and indelibly so, for there is no relief 
for their guilt. 
In Walzer's example, Arthur Harris, the commander of the Royal 
Air Force at the time, is the unfortunate chap who took the brunt of 
the impossible situation of living the paradox: "After the strategic air 
offensive ended in mid-April [1945], Bomber Command was slighted 
and snubbed; and Harris, unlike other well-known commanders, was 
not rewarded with a peerage" (JUW 324). Furthermore, among the 
many plaques commemorating World War II heroism, "the bomber 
pilots, though they suffered far heavier casualties, have no plaque" 
(JUW324). Moreover, this was not an administrative oversight, but "a 
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deliberate policy that has moral significance and value" (JUW 324). 
That is, Harris did what was necessary, and therefore right. He had 
also, however, put an end to the lives of countless innocents, which is 
why his hands were 'dirty' or 'bloody.' Harris did what is both right 
and wrong at the same time. His actions were necessary but shame-
ful, and thus not worthy of honor. With the exception that Churchill 
should have also been thrown in with this 'dirty-handed' lot, Walzer 
approves of England's policy. This is Walzer's solution to how the su-
preme emergency exemption can offer real-world moral advice even 
though it makes us say "yes" and "no" at the same time: a nation must 
do what is necessary when faced with a genuine emergency, but the 
perpetrators of civilian deaths should not be honored, for it is not 
fitting to honor disgraceful actions. By overriding the principle of 
discrimination, the supreme emergency creates a paradox, but not 
a 'paralyzing' paradox: a nation can indeed successfully enact the 
supreme emergency exemption, as England showed in World War II. 
§ 5 . Orend's Doctr ine of the Moral Di lemma 
Orend recognizes the need for a SEE, but criticizes Walzer's at-
tempt to incorporate it into JWT. He claims that viewing this state 
of affairs in its moral aspect alone is too limited, for the 'prudential' 
perspective must be added: "Morally, a supreme emergency is a ter-
rible tragedy. Prudentially, it is a struggle for survival" (JWT 149)." 
Significantly, Orend is convinced that this removes the paradoxical 
standing of the SEE, for his theory does not give "the right to do 
wrong, and/or a duty to violate duty," as Walzer's does (JWT 149). 
In Walzer's theory, targeting civilians is both just and unjust. Orend 
rejects this idea: "if you do wrong, you do wrong, even under the 
pressure of supreme emergency conditions" (JWT 149). For Orend, 
this state of affairs is more accurately described as a tragic dilemma 
rather than a paradox, for both options are tragedies. Orend points 
out that there is only 'wrong' here, because it is morally wrong to 
murder the innocent civilians of your enemy whatever the reason, 
but it is also morally wrong to stand by and allow your own civilians 
1 1 Just War Theory: A Reappraisal. Edited by Mark Evans. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005 ed. 
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to be slaughtered. In a true SEE, this is what would happen if the of-
fending nation were allowed to be victorious. 
Having reclassified the paradox as a dilemma, Orend turns to 
the 'prudential' perspective, from which "a supreme emergency is a 
desperate, Hobbesian struggle for survival" (JWT 149). What he does 
is merely to recommend rules that provide guidance for the use of a 
supreme emergency exemption.1 2 Orend thus believes that there is 
not a paradox to live, but a dilemma to be navigated. He believes that 
by giving sensible direction to a nation's decision to choose one horn 
of the dilemma, he has satisfied the critics of the supreme emer-
gency exemption. 
§ 6 . Critique o f Walzer and Orend 
In Walzer's view, the problem with the paradox is not that it ex-
ists, but that it seems to be unable to offer any coherent, real-world 
moral advice. His 'dirty hands' policy is an attempt to resolve this is-
sue by articulating rules for how a nation may actually target civilians 
directly in drastic circumstances. Thus, he attempts to show that it is 
possible after all to derive practical recommendations from this state 
of affairs, thinking that the success of this argument has justified the 
existence of the supreme emergency exemption. Although Orend 
criticizes Walzer, his solution is not much different; he renames the 
paradox a dilemma, and then offers practical advice to a nation at-
tempting to navigate the dilemma. 
Walzer and Orend, however, have both missed the point. The 
paradox created by the SEE is not troubling primarily because it 
threatens to offer no actionable advice, but because it threatens to 
undermine just war theory itself. Theories in general with paradox-
es, exemptions, exceptions, or tragic dilemmas are destined for re-
jection. Those who would disparage the very notion of rules within 
warfare as self-defeating—the 'war is hell' theorists—could use Wal-
zer's own writings as proof that there is no sense to aspire to an ideal 
of just warfare. Walzer, in another part of his book, aptly describes 
General Sherman's utterance that 'war is hell': 
1 2 See Just War Theory, pp. 149-151. 
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His maxim sums up, with admirable brevity, a whole way of 
thinking about war . . . In his view, war is entirely and singu-
larly the crime of those who began it, and soldiers resisting 
aggression (or rebellion) can never be blamed for anything 
they do that brings this victory closer. The sentence War is 
hell is doctrine, not description: it is a moral argument, an at-
tempt at self-justification. Sherman was claiming to be inno-
cent of all those actions (though they were his own actions) 
for which he was so severely attacked (JUW32). 
Despite its ubiquitous misuse, the saying 'war is hell' was not 
originally intended as a description of the horrors of warfare. Rather, 
it was advanced as explanation of questionable conduct in warfare. 
Thus, 'war is hell' can be thought of as a rival doctrine to just war 
theory—one that states that the end justifies the means, and there-
fore, any action taken toward a just goal is acceptable. This would 
of course, include even the direct targeting of civilians. This theory 
could recognize the principles of going to war advanced by just war 
theory, but it holds that once a war has begun, all of the actions done 
committed by a nation that adhered to the principles of jus ad bel-
lum are justified. The just war principles of jus in bello, however, are 
senseless. 
Walzer and Orend have unintentionally given powerful justifica-
tion for the 'war is hell' theory of fighting a war. Walzer has shown, 
through his dirty hands policy, how it is simultaneously possible to 
acknowledge the paradox created by a supreme emergency exemp-
tion and yet act in the face of it. Since Walzer saw this as the only 
obstacle to accepting the paradox, he believes that he has solved the 
problem. Orend's theory supports the 'war is hell' doctrine to the 
same degree. He has claimed it is dilemma of which both horns are 
morally wrong (targeting enemy civilians, allowing civilians of one's 
own nation to be killed). Therefore, the only question is a prudential 
one. However, this is exactly Sherman's point. War inevitably brings these 
dilemmas with no morally right horn, and so it is senseless to make 
this a moral issue. When fighting a war, there are only prudential 
concerns about how to win it. If this is the debate, Sherman's 'war is 
hell' theory is better than traditional JWT. 
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§7. Rethinking the Principle of Discrimination 
As a supporter of JWT, my task is clear: the paradox must be re-
moved, or Sherman's theory will have to be taken seriously. The key 
is to discover a moral principle that is shared by both the principle 
of discrimination and the principle of proportionality. Following the 
humanitarian intervention tradition, we may identify this principle 
as the principle of minimal force.11 As I formulate it, the principle of 
minimal force simply states that once a nation has met all the criteria 
of jus ad bellum, when in the war it must always use the least amount 
of force possible to achieve victory. This preserves the relevant moral 
intuitions expressed in the principles of discrimination and propor-
tionality, since they were obviously both formulated specifically in 
order to minimize the violence involved in fighting a war. 
Since there is a single principle under-girding both of these prin-
ciples, there is no reason that we should not explicitly recognize this 
'principle of principles'; I submit, therefore, that the principle of 
minimal force should be acknowledged as the locus of all jus in hello 
principles. We can subsequently re-categorize the principles of dis-
crimination and proportionality as sub-principles. That is, they are 
principles that seek to give detail to the principle of minimal force, 
but they do not establish rules that extend the principle of minimal 
force. This is to make these sub-principles conditional. In Walzer's 
formulation, however, the principle of discrimination sounds like the 
11 t h commandment: 'Thou shalt not target civilians.' Therefore, when 
a commander-in-chief such as Churchill is forced to target civilians, a 
paradox is created. However, in my reformulation, the only rule that 
is absolute is the principle of minimal force. The principle of dis-
crimination is appropriately reformulated as a conditional: "You may 
never target civilians except in the case of a supreme emergency." 
If a wartime situation is a genuine emergency, then the principle 
of minimal force justifies the disregard of the principle of discrimina-
tion, because in that case, the minimum amount of force necessary 
to quell, say, the Nazi invasion, is specifically to bomb German civil-
1 3 See, for example, the UN-sanctioned report The Responsibility to Protect, 
issued by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS): "The Responsibility to Protect," Ottawa: The International Develop-
ment Research Centre, 2001. 
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ians. In normal wartime, when we make a special effort not to target 
civilians, we are also using the principle of minimal force, and thus 
fighting justly. This is to abandon the schizophrenia of a paradox for 
the coherence of a single rule. It is for this reason that my suggestion 
is an improvement of the theories of Walzer and Orend, for they 
have no reason to expect someone to believe in a theory that violates 
its own rules, especially when there is a completely coherent rival 
theory—'war is hell'—asking for our consideration. 
§ 8 . State o f the Argument 
There is a potential complaint that this change is merely a se-
mantic change. That is, no actual action or moral recommenda-
tion changes by substituting the principle of minimal force, and so 
my proposed change may be seen to be an unimportant one. This 
complaint misses the point entirely, for the beauty of my proposal 
is precisely that is does not need to make new or different moral 
recommendations for how, example, Churchill should have directed 
the Royal Air Force in 1940. Rather, the principle of minimal force 
removes the awkward acknowledgement of a paradox created by the 
conflict between the principle of discrimination and the supreme 
emergency exemption. It is able to do this because this principle is 
large enough to contain the intuitions behind both the principle and 
the exemption. The result of this change is not a new set of require-
ments for acting in the face of imminent and horrendous danger, but 
the greater likelihood that just war theory will be taken seriously. 
It is my hope that this semantic change will cause some to rethink 
their adoption of the 'war-is-hell' theory. I regard just war theory's 
intuitions as laudable, and they should be preserved and advanced. 
This has the best likelihood of happening if my suggestion is incor-
porated. 
